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I. INTRODUCTIONT HIS COMMENT will examine the current treatment of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) in U.S. courts. The
ADA is of the utmost importance to the airline industry because
it provides for the preemption of many state law claims against
air carriers. The goal of this Comment is to compile the most
important recent cases construing the ADA and to provide a
thoughtful analysis of the implications of those cases.
II. THE ADA AND THE COURTS
The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to rule on
the ADA two times since 1992. The Court's opinions in these
cases have unleashed much controversy and have not settled
many issues. Indeed, these opinions have served only to in-
crease the clamor about the ADA and have led lower courts to
issue conflicting rulings.
A. THE ADA PREEMPTION PROVISION AND THE SAVINGS CLAUSE
The ADA specifically states that certain state statutory and
common-law claims may not be brought against air carriers:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivi-
sion of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route or service of an air
carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.'
1 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994). This provision replaced the original preemp-
tion provision in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1143 (1994). The original
preemption provision prohibited States from enforcing any "law relating to [air
carriers'] rates, routes, or services." 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1) (1994). The purpose
of the new codification was "to restate in comprehensive form, without substan-
tive change, certain general and permanent laws related to transportation [in-
cluding the ADA] . . . and to make other technical improvements in the Code."
H.R. REP. No. 103-180 at 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818. The vast
majority of cases discussed in this Comment deal with the repealed version of the
law. In light of the legislative history of Pub. L. No. 103-272, however, any change
in the wording of the statute should have no bearing on its interpretation by the
courts. For the specific changes enacted by Congress to the preemption provi-




This provision of the ADA has generated a tremendous amount
of litigation.
Courts have often construed this subsection with another sec-
tion of the ADA (termed the "savings clause"), which states that
"[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies
provided by law."2 The interplay between these two sections of
the ADA has been at the core of many disputes that have found
their way into state and federal courts.
B. THE ADA IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Since 1992, the United States Supreme Court has issued two
rulings construing the ADA and, in particular, these two sec-
tions. The first, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,3 was a
landmark decision in which the Court attempted to explain,
among other items, if the preemption provision now found in
section 41713(b) preempted claims arising under a state decep-
tive trade practices act. The second, American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens,4 presented the Court with the question of whether the
ADA preempted breach of contract claims against air carriers.
These two rulings have led to much litigation in lower courts,
both state and federal, concerning the preemption issue.
Judges have struggled to develop a consistent methodology of
applying Morales and Wolens.
The remainder of this Comment will be devoted to an exami-
nation of the application of the preemption provision, the sav-
ings clause, and the Morales and Wolens opinions over the past
few years. Additionally, holdings of various lower courts will be
examined in order to ascertain whether they answer any of the
questions that have surfaced since the advent of Morales and
Wolens. Before turning to an in-depth examination of those two
cases, it will be useful for the reader to briefly review the pre-
Morales state of preemption litigation.
2 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994). Again, in 1994 Congress changed this section
with Pub. L. No. 103-272. The previous section provided that "[n]othing ... in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1994). Similarly, the legislative history indicates
that Congress did not intend to affect any change of the statute's interpretation
by the courts, as the section was changed in order "to eliminate unnecessary
words and for clarity and consistency in the revised title and with other titles of
the United States Code." H.R. REP. No. 103-180 at 276 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 1093.
3 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
4 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
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III. PREEMPTION LAW BEFORE MORALES AND WOLENS
Before the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its Morales deci-
sion in 1992, cases involving the preemption provision of the
ADA generally fell into two categories: (1) those involving eco-
nomic and regulatory issues; and (2) those involving some type
of personal injury claim, including state law tort claims.5 Courts
often held that the preemption provision barred claims in the
first category.6 Under this rubric, for example, courts ruled that
the ADA preemption provision barred claims involving seating
for the physically challenged, proscribed conduct (such as smok-
ing), related to unruly passengers.7
In contrast, courts generally held that claims which arose
from "traditional" tort claims under state law were not pre-
empted.8 Courts have stated that the reason for sustaining such
claims was "that the scope of the [ADA] should not be so broad
that it is used as a justification for the preemption of all conceiv-
able state law claims having a remote connection to 'rates,
routes, or services."' 9 Such was the delineation faced by the
Supreme Court when it heard Morales in 1992. While the
Morales opinion did not expressly strike down the two category
system just described, it did unleash a maelstrom of confusion,
causing lower courts to adjudicate preemption cases in a
nonuniform manner.
IV. THE MORALES DECISION
The Morales case began when Texas Attorney General Jim
Mattox, relying on Air Travel Enforcement Guidelines devel-
oped by the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG),
sent a memorandum to several airlines complaining of a lack of
5 Khan v. American Airlines, 639 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
6 Id. See, e.g., Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d
751 (7th Cir. 1989) (claims against air carrier brought under state consumer
fraud statute barred by ADA preemption provision); see also Daniel Petroski, Air-
lines'Response to the DTPA Section 1305 Preemption, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 125 (1990).
7 Kahn, 639 N.E.2d at 212. See, e.g., O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863
F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989) (claims arising from the "wrongful exclusion" of noisy
passengers preempted); Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(case based on seating of physically challenged passenger preempted); Diefen-
thai v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982) (challenges to rules
prohibiting smoking preempted).
8 Kahn, 639 N.E.2d at 212. See, e.g., In reAir Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988) (tort claims arising from airplane
crash not preempted).
9 Kahn, 639 N.E.2d at 212 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988)).
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adequate disclosure in airline advertising.' ° Mattox sent the
memorandum despite notification from both the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Trade Commission that the
NAAG guidelines were violative of the ADA preemption provi-
sion and contrary to public policy."
The airlines initiated the litigation by seeking a preliminary
injunction in federal court against Mattox, which would have
prevented him from bringing enforcement actions against the
airlines under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act (DTPA).12 The district court granted the air-
lines' motion, stating that any enforcement action brought
against the airlines under any state law regarding the airlines'
advertising was preempted by federal law.13
In 1990, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district
court.1" The court stated that "it [was] clear that by enacting
§ 1305 Congress intended to retain in the federal govern-
ment[ ] exclusive authority over airline advertising of fares."' 15
The court also noted that the Department of Transportation
had the power to bring actions against airlines resulting from
unfair and deceptive trade practices, and, therefore, the court
did not feel that it was leaving the airlines in an unregulated
"vacuum which the states needed to fill in order to protect their
citizens."' 6
10 Morales, 504 U.S. at 379. An excerpt from the NAAG guidelines can be
found in the appendix to the Morales opinion. Id. at 391. They include detailed
rules concerning fare advertisements (print, commercials, and billboards), fare
availability, surcharges, frequent flyer programs, and other topics.
11 Id. at 379.
12 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989). The
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act is codified at TEx.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
13 Mattox, 712 F. Supp. at 101. The court did not, however, specifically men-
tion the ADA preemption provision. Rather, it relied on the "Commerce Clause
... the Constitutional prohibition against interstate compacts that intrude into
the federal domain . . . [and the] Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights." Id.
14 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
15 Id. at 783.
16 Id. The statute giving the Department of Transportation such authority now
provides:
On the initiative of the Secretary of Transportation or the com-
plaint of an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, and if the
Secretary considers it is in the public interest, the Secretary may
investigate and decide whether an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or
ticket agent has been or is engaged in an unfair or deceptive prac-
tice or an unfair method of competition in air transportation or the
sale of air transportation. If the Secretary, after notice and an op-
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The U.S. Supreme Court defined the issue before it in Morales
as "at bottom ... one of statutory intent.'1 7 The Court had to
determine just how broad the phrase "relating to" in the ADA
preemption provision swept.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia referred to the definition
of the word "relate": "to stand in some relation; to have bearing
or concern; to pertain; refer."'" The Justice went on to note that
the phrase "express [ed] a broad pre-emptive purpose" and that
a similarly worded clause in the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) had been given "a broad
scope" and "an expansive sweep."' 9
Justice Scalia then explained the Court's rejection of the
states' arguments. To begin with, the Justice rejected the notion
that comparison of the ADA to ERISA was improper.2" Addi-
tionally, the Justice stated that the states' reading of the preemp-
tion clause as only prohibiting states "from actually prescribing
rates, routes, or services .... simply [read] the words 'relating
to' out of the statute."' 21 Justice Scalia also rejected the notion
that preemption only applies to "state laws specifically addressed
to the airline industry. ' 22 Finally, the Justice stated that the "pre-
emption provision ... displace [s] all state laws that fall within its
sphere, even including state laws that are consistent . . . " with
the Department of Transportation's ability to regulate
advertising. 2
The Justice closed with a few remarks that are also worthy of
note. He argued that if such state law claims were not pre-
portunity for a hearing, finds that an air carrier, foreign air carrier,
or ticket agent is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or un-
fair method of competition, the Secretary shall order the air car-
rier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to stop the practice or
method.
49 U.S.C. § 41712 (1994).
17 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.
18 Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)).
19 Id. at 383-84.
20 Id. at 384.
21 Id. at 385.
22 Id. at 386.
23 Id. at 387. For example, the Texas DTPA forbids:
the failure to disclose information concerning goods or services
which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to
disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer
into a transaction into which the consumer would not have entered
had the information been disclosed.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
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empted, it "would give consumers a cause of action ... for an
airline's failure to provide a particular advertised fare-effec-
tively creating an enforceable right to that fare when the adver-
tisement fails to include the [NAAG-]mandated explanations
and disclaimers. "24 Next, Justice Scalia argued that airlines must
be free of state regulation of advertising in order to remain prof-
itable. "The [NAAG] guidelines severely burden . . ." the air-
lines' ability to fill their flights in a profitable manner.25 The
Justice then quoted from a Federal Trade Commission letter to
the deputy attorney general of California, pointing out another
adverse effect of the NAAG guidelines, namely that "requiring
too much information in advertisements can have the paradoxi-
cal effect of stifling the information that consumers receive.126
Finally, Justice Scalia explained that the ADA does not pre-
empt all state law claims against airlines. In particular, state reg-
ulation of the nonprice aspects of advertising could be
permissible, as could state laws prohibiting gambling and prosti-
tution as applied to airlines 7.2  The Justice closed by stating that
"[s]ome state actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to have preemptive effect. "28
V. THE WOLENS DECISION
The United States Supreme Court most recently ruled on a
case dealing with the scope of the ADA preemption provision in
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 29 issued in January of 1995. In
Wolens, the Court considered two consolidated state class actions
brought against American Airlines under Illinois law.
A. THE COURT AGAIN RULES THAT THE ADA PREEMPTS STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIMS
The plaintiffs in both cases were participants in American's
frequent flyer program, AAdvantage.3 ° The complaints con-
cerned American's imposition of retroactive cutbacks on the use
of previously received credits that could be exchanged for free
air tickets.31 The plaintiffs maintained that the retroactive
24 Morales, 504 U.S. at 388.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 390.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
so Id. at 822.
31 Id.
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changes in the AAdvantage program violated the Illinois Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (IDBPA)12
and constituted a breach of contract. 3
The Supreme Court stated that the state statutory claims re-
lated to "rates" because the claims arose out of "American's
charges in the form of mileage credits for free tickets ... [and
related to] 'services"' because the claims arose from "access to
flights. ' 34 The Court went on to say that the real issue in the
case was the interpretation of the words "enact or enforce any
law" in the ADA preemption clause, which at the time stated
that "[n] o state ... shall enact or enforce any law ... relating to
[air carrier] rates, routes, or services." 5
The Court ruled that the ADA preempted the claims arising
under the IDBPA 6.3  As the Court pointed out, the IDBPA "is
paradigmatic of the consumer protection legislation underpin-
ning the NAAG guidelines. '37 Because the IDBPA "serve [d] as a
means to guide and police the marketing practices of airlines,"
the ADA preempted the application of the IDBPA to the actions
of American. 8 The Court noted, as it did in Morales, that the
Department of Transportation retained the authority to regu-
late airlines in a manner similar to the IDBPA.3 In summary,
the Court agreed with American's argument that "Congress
could hardly have intended to allow the States to hobble [com-
32 The IDBPA is codified at 815 ILL. COMp. STAT. 505/1 - 505/12 (West 1992).
The specific statute in question forbade:
[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of
any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresenta-
tion or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material
fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppres-
sion or omission of such material fact . . . in the conduct of any
trade or commerce ... whether any person has in fact been misled,
deceived or damaged thereby.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (West 1992). This language mirrors the language of
the NAAG Guidelines discussed in Morales.
33 Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 822.
'4 Id. at 823.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 823-24.
37 Id. at 823.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 823 n.4. The Court revealed that the Department of Transportation
issued 34 cease and desist orders pursuant to its regulatory authority and assessed




petition for airline passengers] through the application of re-
strictive state laws." 40
B. THE ADA DOES NOT PREEMPT CLAIMS OF BREACH OF
CONTRACT
The Wolens Court did, however, uphold the plaintiffs' claims
based on the theory of breach of contract. The Court reasoned
that "terms and conditions airlines offer and passengers accept
are privately ordered obligations 'and thus do not amount to a
State's enact[ment] or enforce [ment] [of] any law, rule, regula-
tion, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of
law' within the meaning of [the ADA preemption provision]."' 4'
Additionally, the Court also pointed out that the ADA was
crafted with the goal of "maxim[izing] reliance on competitive
market forces. ' 42 Allowing claims for breach of contract to be
maintained would serve this goal.
Since the Supreme Court's opinions in Morales and Wolens,
lower federal and state courts have returned rulings construing
the ADA preemption clause that have often conflicted with each
other. The following analysis supports this contention and dem-
onstrates that Morales and Wolens have done little to settle the
question of how far federal preemption of state law claims
against air carriers reaches. The focus of the courts has now
switched to the construction of the terms "rates" and "services"
40 Id. at 824 (quoting Brief of American Airlines at 27).
41 Id. (quoting Brief of the United States as amicus curiae). The Supreme
Court long ago held that judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory restric-
tive covenants contained in deeds to private real property constituted "state ac-
tion" that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1947). The Court stated that "[s]tate action
... refers to exertions of state power in all forms." Id. The Court also rejected
the argument that 'judicial enforcement of private agreements does not amount
to state action ...... Id. at 14.
Is Wolens consistent with Shelley? The plaintiffs in Wolens attempted to enforce
"privately ordered obligations" not unlike the plaintiffs in Shelley. Nonetheless,
the Wolens Court held that the ADA did not preempt judicial enforcement of
such obligations. Does not the judicial enforcement of "privately ordered obliga-
tions" constitute the "enact[ment] or enforce [ment] [of a] law..." in light of the
fact that "[s] tate action ... refers to exertions of state power in all forms"?
42 Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824. The Court also cited RICHARD POSNER, AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 90-91 (4th ed. 1992), for the proposition that "legal en-
forcement of contracts is more efficient than a purely voluntary system" and
Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theoyy, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 303,
315 (1988) for the proposition that remedies for breach of contract are "neces-
sary in order to ensure economic efficiency." Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824.
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and away from the construction of the phrase "relates to" as in
Morales.43
VI. CASES CONCERNING "RATES"
Wolens changed the way courts have approached rulings con-
cerning what claims actually relate to "rates" for purposes of the
ADA preemption clause. Statland v. American Airlines, Inc.44 pro-
vides an excellent example of a post-Morales, pre-Wolens case re-
garding "rates." In Statland, the court dealt with a class action
claim against American concerning penalties assessed to tick-
eted passengers resulting from the cancellation of their tickets.45
American's policy was to keep ten percent of both the ticket
price and the federal tax paid by the ticket purchaser whenever
a passenger canceled a ticket.46 The plaintiffs claimed that
American's practice contravened Department of Transportation
regulations in that the tickets purchased did not state that Amer-
ican had the right to retain ten percent of the purchase price in
the event of cancellation.47
The plaintiffs brought claims against American under section
411 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act4 and under Illinois state law
for breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the IDBPA,49 conver-
sion, and breach of contract.50 The court held that the Federal
Aviation Act did not create a private right of action and that the
ADA preempted the state law claims.
43 The construction of the term "routes" has not been a frequent subject of
litigation and will not be considered in this Comment.




48 This provision has been recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (1994). See supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
5o Statland, 998 F.2d at 539, 541-42.
51 Id. at 540. Concerning the private right of action under the Federal Avia-
tion Act, the court stated "that a private cause of action is seldom implied for
statutes framed as general commands to a federal agency or for statutes that do
not create rights for a specific class of persons." Id. (citing Evanston v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 825 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987)). The court went on to say
that it was not Congress's intent to give plaintiffs such as Statland a private cause
of action under the Federal Aviation Act. Id. If not so, then "every law regulating
a business would give its customers an implied private right to sue." Id.
Many courts have ruled that the ADA preemption provision does not, by itself,
create a private right of action. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 833 F.2d 200, 207 (9th Cir. 1987); Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v.
Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986). Moreover, the
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The court gave a terse explanation of the operation of the
ADA preemption provision in the case. It cited Morales's view of
the ADA as having a "broad pre-emptive purpose" and noted its
own prior holding that the ADA preempted a state law claim
against an airline regarding the airline's ticket advertising poli-
cies. 2 The court thus concluded in a succinct manner "that [it]
is obvious that canceled ticket refunds relate to rates. 5 3
The court's holding in Vail v. Pan Am Corp.54 also comports
with the logic of Statland. The plaintiffs in Vail alleged that from
1986 to 1989, Pan Am falsely advertised that it was instituting an
enhanced security program and, thus, fraudulently charged five
dollars per ticket in order to recoup the costs of the program.55
The plaintiffs stated that the ADA did not preempt their claims
for "nothing more than traditional actions for fraud and breach
of contract [because] they did not seek to regulate rates or to
'usurp the industry's authority to regulate security measures. '56
Finally, the plaintiffs stated that the savings clause prevented
preemption of their claims because the savings clause "contem-
plates that unless the common-law claim and the federal Act are
'absolutely inconsistent,' they may coexist."57
The court did not agree with the plaintiffs' contentions. The
court noted Morales's "broad interpretation" of the preemption
clause. 58 The court then rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on the
Federal Aviation Act and its corresponding regulations do not create an implied
private cause of action. In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400,
407-08 (9th Cir. 1983). A private right of action does not exist unless Congress
has demonstrated an unequivocal intent to devise such a right. Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
For further commentary on implied private rights of action under federal law,
see H. Miles Foy III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private
Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501 (1986); Bruce A.
Boyer, Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the Ongoing Vitality of
Cort v. Ash, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 722 (1985); Donna L. Goldstein, Note, Implied
Private Rights of Action Under Federal Statutes: Congressional Intent, Judicial Deference,
or Mutual Abdication?, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 611 (1982).
52 Statland, 998 F.2d at 541 (citing Illinois Corp. Travel, Inc. v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 1989)).
53 Id. at 542.
54 616 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
55 Id. at 524.
56 Id. at 525 (apparently quoting the plaintiffs' brief).
57 Id. (quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 300 (1975)).
See supra note 2 and accompanying text, which discusses the savings clause.
58 Vail, 616 A.2d at 526. The plaintiffs' claim relating to Pan Am's advertising
was rejected by the court as being analogous to the claim rejected by the
Supreme Court in Morales. Id. at 525.
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savings clause and applied the Morales reasoning that "[a] gen-
eral 'remedies' saving clause cannot be allowed to supersede the
specific substantive pre-emption provision [now found at 49
U.S.C. § 41713(b)]. 59
The court then added a policy-based argument:
If the airline's conduct were fraudulent or deceptive, state courts
could fashion remedies, applying state law, proscribing certain
advertising and compelling the airline to repay customers
surcharges and other 'rates' charged to air passengers. The re-
sult would be multiple and potentially conflicting standards con-
trolling advertising, services, and rates. The conclusion is
inescapable that Congress intended to reject the dual enforce-
ment of state law claims relating to rates ....60
Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs claims were barred by
the operation of the ADA."
Since the advent of Wolens, however, courts have been forced
to rethink the approaches taken in Vail and Statland for cases
concerning "rates." Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.62 provides
an excellent example of this fact. The case involved two consoli-
dated class action suits brought by ticket holders against air car-
riers concerning penalties assessed on canceled tickets."3 The
plaintiffs claimed that the airlines had informed them that upon
cancellation of their tickets they would be required to pay a pen-
alty equal to twenty-five percent of the total fare."4 When they
did cancel their tickets, however, the airlines assessed penalties
based on twenty-five percent of the total price of the ticket, an
amount which included federal transportation tax. 65 The Illi-
nois appellate court that heard the case originally affirmed the
trial court's orders granting the air carriers' motions to dismiss
based on Morales."" The Supreme Court, however, vacated the
appellate court's ruling and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of Wolens, which it handed down after the original
appeal."
5) 1d. at 526.
w) Id. at 526-27.
61 Id. at 528.
62 663 N.E.2d 54 (I1. App. Ct. 1996).




67 Id. at 56; see Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 817.
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On remand, the court pointed out that Wolens stands for the
proposition that the ADA does not preempt breach of contract
claims against air carriers stemming from their self-imposed du-
ties and obligations.68 The court then clarified the required
analysis:
If the obligation allegedly breached is solely a self-imposed un-
dertaking that the airline itself undertook to perform, a breach
of that undertaking is not preempted. But, if the source of the
obligation that has allegedly been breached is a state law or pol-
icy, external to the airline's own self-imposed undertaking, a
breach of that obligation is preempted.69
The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were not pre-
empted because they involved "an agreement between the air-
lines and the plaintiffs."70
Wolens, therefore, would change the result of "rates" cases
such as Statland and Vail. It would appear that many cases in-
volving "rates" are now free from the threat of preemption to
the extent that such cases involve the self-imposed duties of air
carriers as reflected in the language of the tickets which they
issue. A breach of the terms included in a ticket constituting the
contract between an air carrier and its passenger is clearly ac-
tionable under Wolens.
VII. CASES CONCERNING "SERVICES"
Since Morales and Wolens, a far more contentious area ofjuris-
prudence has developed concerning what exactly are "services"
for purposes of the ADA. The next portion of this Comment
will examine the many divergent cases that the courts have
handed down since Morales and Wolens dealing with this
question.
A. HoDcs AND SMIT. THE FIF-rH CIRCUIT APPROACH
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.71 involved a passenger who was in-
jured in flight when another passenger opened an overhead
compartment and caused a case of rum to fall to the floor.7 2
Plaintiff Hodges suffered lacerations on her arm and wrist as a
68 Johnson, 663 N.E.2d at 56-57.
69 Id. at 57.
70 Id.
71 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
72 Id. at 335.
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result.7" In her lawsuit against the air carrier, Hodges claimed
that the air carrier's negligence had caused her injuries and
medical expenses."4 The Fifth Circuit had to decide whether
the ADA preempted the plaintiffs state law tort claim stemming
from the alleged negligent operation of an aircraft.7 5
The court opened its opinion by reciting the goal of the ADA:
the dismantling of federal economic regulation of the U.S. air-
line industry.7 6 It also pointed out that while Morales mandates
that "whatever state laws 'relate to rates, routes or services' are
broadly preempted," Morales does not define "services."77 The
court adhered to the definition of "services" it had previously
developed in the first hearing of Hodges, namely, that "'services'
generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated provision of
labor from one party to another."7
The court also pointed to statements of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) to support its view of the solely economic nature
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. This opinion stems from the second hearing of the case before the Fifth
Circuit. The case was first argued in 1993 and published as Hodges v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993). The court felt bound by a previously un-
published decision (Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.
1990)) that forced it to conclude that the ADA acted to preempt the plaintiffs
state law claims. Hodges, 4 F.3d at 355.
The court stated that "Morales inform[ed] but [did] not squarely resolve this
case." Id. at 353. The court argued that under "the definition of 'services' . . .
most plausible in light of the ADA's purpose and historical regulatory anteced-
ents, it appear[ed] that 'services' [was] not coextensive with airline 'safety'." Id.
at 354. As stated, the court felt bound by Baugh to rule as it did, although the
court strongly urged an en banc review of its decision. Id. at 352, 356. The
Hodges formulation discussed in the remainder of this Comment has as its source
the en banc decision found at 44 F.3d 334.
76 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 335.
77 Id. at 336.
78 Id. The court went on to further explain its view of services:
If the element of bargain or agreement is incorporated in our un-
derstanding of services, it leads to a concern with the contractual
arrangement between the airline and the user of the service. Ele-
ments of the air carrier service bargain include items such as ticket-
ing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and
bagging handling, in addition to the transportation itself. These
matters are all appurtenant and necessarily included with the con-
tract of carriage between the passenger or shipper and the airline.
It is these [contractual] features of air transportation that we be-
lieve Congress intended to de-regulate as "services" and broadly to
protect from state regulation.
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of the term "services. ' 79 The court stressed that the CAB's char-
acterization of "services" "strongly support[ed] the view that the
ADA was concerned solely with economic deregulation, not with
displacing state tort law."" °
The court also opined that Congress did not intend to shelter
airlines from all state law claims for personal injuries.8 ' The
court relied on a provision of the Federal Aviation Act that re-
quires air carriers to carry insurance covering bodily injuries
and death resulting from the operation of aircraft.8 2 The re-
quirement to procure insurance could not "be understated, for
it could only be understood to qualify the scope of 'services' re-
moved from state regulation by [the ADA preemption provi-
sion]."83 The court concluded that complete preemption would
have rendered the insurance requirement meaningless.8 4
Thus, the court announced a new dichotomy concerning the
term "services" for purposes of the ADA preemption provision.
State law tort claims arising from the "operation and mainte-
nance of aircraft" were not preempted by the ADA whereas state
law tort claims arising from the "economic services" provided by
an air carrier were preempted. 5 Under the court's formulation,
79 Id. at 337.
80 Id. In a portion of the Statements of General Policy not quoted by the court,
the CAB opines:
[P]reemption extends to all of the economic factors that go into
the provision of the quid pro quo for passenger's fare, including
flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reservation and board-
ing practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertain-
ment, bonding and corporate financing; and we hereby occupy
these fields completely.
Implementation of the Preemption Provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, 44 Fed. Reg. 9948, 9951 (1979).
81 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338.
82 Id. The current version of this provision states:
The Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate to a citizen
of the United States to provide air transportation as an air carrier
... only if the citizen complies with regulations and orders of the
Secretary governing the filing of an insurance policy .... The pol-
icy... must be sufficient to pay.., for bodily injury to, or death of,
an individual for loss of, or damage to, property of others, resulting
from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft under the
certificate.
49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (1994).
83 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 338-39.
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then, the "service" provided by an airline is distinct from "opera-
tion and maintenance" of an aircraft.
The court pointed out two examples of cases that would still
be barred by the ADA under its new formulation. The first in-
cluded "wrongful exclusion" cases-cases in which passengers
are ejected from flights due to inappropriate behavior.8 6 The
second included "bumping" cases-cases in which passengers
are precluded from boarding planes due to overbooking. 7
Hodges's companion case, Smith v. America West Airlines Inc.,"
provided the Fifth Circuit with an immediate opportunity to ap-
ply its newfound dichotomy of "economic services" as opposed
to the "operation and maintenance of aircraft." In Smith, several
passengers who had been on board a hijacked airplane filed suit
against the air carrier claiming that the air carrier was negligent
in permitting the alleged hijacker to board the airplane.89
The air carrier's preemption argument was based on the fact
that if the state law claims were allowed to be maintained, it
would "result in significant de facto regulation of the airlines'
boarding practices "9.... 0 Additionally, the air carrier cited a
previous case in which the Fifth Circuit held that a claim of
wrongful eviction of a passenger was barred by the ADA.9 ' The
air carrier appeared to argue that if the ADA barred suits based
on the wrongful eviction of a passenger, then the ADA should
bar a suit based on the wrongful boarding of a passenger as well.
The Fifth Circuit did not agree with the logic of the air carrier's
argument.
The court stated that the analogy to O'Carroll was unpersua-
sive. O'Carroll "involved an alleged breach of the airline's duty
to transport the plaintiff," while the plaintiffs' claims in Smith
had "nothing to do either with the airlines' economic practices
regarding boarding or with the boarding practices [of the air
carrier] .,92 Rather, Smith involved a claim related to the level of
86 Id.
87 Id. at 340.
88 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
89 Id. at 345. The district court granted the air carrier's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the ADA. Id.
90 Id. at 346 (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339).
91 Id. (citing O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989)).
92 Id. at 347.
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safety provided to passengers and the disregard for that safety by
"permitting a visibly deranged man to board. 93
The court closed by stating that the plaintiffs' claims were not
barred by the ADA preemption provision. The possible recov-
ery of damages by the plaintiffs would, in the eyes of the court,
affect the airline's ticket sales and security; however, such dam-
ages would neither affect nor "regulate the economic or con-
tractual aspects of boarding."94
B. HARjS. THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
Not long after the Fifth Circuit handed down Hodges and
Smith, the Ninth Circuit issued Harris v. American Airlines, Inc.95
The Ninth Circuit's ruling created an intercircuit conflict that
could lead to another Supreme Court interpretation of the pre-
emption provision. In Harris, the Ninth Circuit was confronted
with the question of whether the ADA preempted state law
claims against an airline for negligence, gross negligence, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of a state
public accommodation statute.96
Plaintiff Harris was a first-class passenger on a flight from Dal-
las, Texas to Portland, Oregon. During the course of the flight,
another passenger seated near Harris allegedly became intoxi-
cated and uttered racial epithets intended to upset Harris.97
Flight attendants stopped serving the unruly passenger, but the
passenger continued to procure alcohol by going to the galley
and preparing his own drinks.98
Plaintiff Harris filed suit in an Oregon court. The court
granted summary judgment for the airline on the merits.99 The
Ninth Circuit, however did not reach the merits of the case, and
93 Id.
94 Id. The court stated that this case was exemplary of those in which the possi-
ble effect on the economic aspects of the operation of an airline would be "too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to be preempted under Morales. Id.
95 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).
96 Id. at 1473. The statute in question, The Oregon Public Accommodation
Act, states: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place
of public accommodation, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction
on account of race, religion, sex, marital status, color or national origin." OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1988).
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upheld the summary judgment in favor of the airline based on
preemption under the ADA. 00
In reaching this conclusion, the court first explained its view
of the Morales decision, and discussed its ruling in the post-
Morales case of West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.1 °1 In West, the
Ninth Circuit held that claims arising under state law against an
airline due to the "bumping" of a passenger were "too tenuously
connected to airline regulation to trigger preemption under the
ADA [and Morales] .... "102 Finally, the court summarized the
holding of Wolens, and then turned to the particulars of the
plaintiffs claims against the airline.
The Ninth Circuit found the case to be one concerning "serv-
ices."" ' The court stated that "[t]he allegations of [the plain-
tiff's] complaint . . show[ed] that she [was] complaining
directly about the service of alcoholic beverages that she
claim[ed] caused [the allegedly intoxicated passenger's] repre-
hensible conduct, and about the airline's response to that con-
duct."'0 4  The court quoted extensively from the plaintiffs
complaint, in which some form of the term "serve" was used at
least three times.'0 5 The court stated that the "allegations per-
tain[ed] directly to a 'service' the airlines render: the provision
of drink. Moreover, they pertain[ed] directly to how airlines
treat passengers who are loud, boisterous, and intoxicated."' 6
100 Id. Ironically, if the plaintiff had filed her case in a federal court located in
Texas, her case would have been governed by the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
the ADA laid down in Hodges and Smith. Thus, she would have likely been
successful.
101 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993).
102 Id. at 151. The plaintiff in West filed claims under Montana state law alleg-
ing a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for unjust dis-
crimination under the Federal Aviation Act.
The opinion found at 995 F.2d 148 is actually the second hearing of West by the
Ninth Circuit. In its first opinion, found at 923 F.2d 657, the court distinguished
between state laws that only had an effect on services provided by airlines and
state laws that related directly to such services. West, 923 F.2d at 660. The court
held that the ADA only preempted the second category of state laws. Id.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit after issuing
Morales. West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 505 U.S. 558 (1992). On remand, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the Court had "invalidated" its earlier approach to pre-
emption and issued the holding as stated in the text above. West, 995 F.2d at 151.
Thus, the plaintiffs claims for compensatory damages were not preempted while
his claims for punitive damages were. Id. at 152.






The plaintiff also claimed that the flight crew failed to follow
procedures detailed in a "Flight Service College Training Out-
line.'10 7 Again, the court concluded "that the conduct of the
flight crew relate[ed] to [a] 'service' under the ADA."1 °8
Having established that the case involved a "service" for pur-
poses of the ADA and, thus, presumptively would be preempted,
the court then turned to whether the case could fit under the
narrow Wolens exception. The court stated that the plaintiffs
claims exemplified an attempt to "subject the airlines' in-flight
service to its passengers to ... state tort law," which meant that
the Wolens exception would not be applicable. 9 The claims
were therefore preempted by the ADA.
A strong dissent, however, noted that the majority had created
an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit's holdings in Hodges
and Smith.110 Circuit Judge Norris stated that the majority had
been mistaken to categorize the plaintiffs claim based on the
service of alcohol to a passenger."' In contrast, Circuit Judge
Norris found the plaintiffs claim in Harris to be analogous to
the plaintiffs claim in Smith." 2
He characterized Harris's case as one "for negligence based
upon the flight crew's failure to protect her from . . . abusive
behavior and for exacerbating the known risk of emotional and
physical injury by serving [the abusive passenger] more alco-
hol.""' 3 Circuit Judge Norris urged that the majority adopt the
Fifth Circuit's approach-that "beverage 'services' preempted
under the ADA [be] limited to economic decisions regarding
the provision of drinks .... ""4 Additionally, CircuitJudge Nor-
ris did not agree with the majority's reliance on Wolens. He in-
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1477.
110 Id. (NorrisJ., dissenting). Additionally, cases exist in the Ninth Circuit sug-
gesting that Harris was improperly decided. See, e.g., Gee v. Southwest Airlines
Co., No. C-94-03983 CW, 1995 WL 652463 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1995). See also text
accompanying infra notes 180-83.
- Harris, 55 F.3d at 1477 (Norris, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1478.
113 Id. Recall, however, that the CAB opined that it preempted the field of
"meal service." See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Is the provision of
drink any different from "meal service"?
114 Haris, 55 F.3d at 1478 (Norris, J., dissenting).
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terpreted Wolens as "suggest[ing] that personal injury claims
were not preempted by the ADA."'1 15
C. TA vEL ALL OvER THE WoRiP. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
APPROACH
The Seventh Circuit has also had a recent opportunity to add
to the jurisprudence surrounding the preemption issue. In
Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,"6 a
travel agency brought claims based on breach of contract, tor-
tious interference with a business relationship, defamation, slan-
der, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against an airline.' 7 The district court dismissed all the claims
based on the ADA preemption clause." 8
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with an explanation of
Morales and Wolens, summarizing the two cases by stating that
there are "two distinct requirements for a law to be expressly
preempted by the ADA: (1) [a] state must 'enact or enforce' a
law that (2) 'relates to' airline rates, routes, or services, either by
expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic
effect upon them.""1 9 It then applied this test to the contract
claim, the slander and defamation claims, and the other inten-
tional tort claims.
"15 Id. Circuit Judge Norris offered several quotes from Wolens to support his
interpretation: "[The airline] does not urge that the ADA preempts personal
injury claims relating to airline operations." Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 825 n.7. "In my
opinion, private tort actions based on common-law negligence or fraud, or on a
statutory prohibition against fraud, are not preempted." Id. at 827 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). "[M]y view of Morales does not mean that personal injury claims
against airlines are always preempted." Id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
116 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).
117 Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudi) was the air carrier in question. The plaintiff
originally sued both Saudi and its owner, the Saudi government, and the district
court granted the government's motion to dismiss.
The travel agency contracted with Saudi to purchase several round trip tickets
for a group traveling from New York to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The agency's cli-
ents were to meet atJFK airport and a representative of the agency was to accom-
pany the group on its trip. The representative's flight was delayed, causing him
to miss the flight fromJFK. Saudi then canceled the group's reservations, forced
the group to purchase new tickets (causing the travel agency to lose commis-
sions), and its employees allegedly made several knowingly false statements about
the travel agency with the intent to injure the agency's business. Id. at 1428.
118 Id. at 1428-29.
119 Id. at 1432.
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The court first held that the breach of contract claim was not
preempted under Wolens.121 While the application of Wolens ap-
peared to be an open and shut case, the air carrier did present
an argument with the hope of distinguishing Wolens, which the
court rejected. The air carrier claimed that the exception from
preemption created by Wolens for "privately ordered obligations"
only applied to duties of air carriers that were not subject to
federal regulation and not to practices such as "bumping,"
which are subject to federal regulation. 121 The court did not
accept this argument, stating that "It]he question of whether a
State has 'enacted or enforced a law' cannot depend on the
existence of federal regulations in the same area. 122
The court then turned to an analysis of the slander and defa-
mation claims. Noting that courts have not come to consistent
conclusions regarding whether the ADA preempts slander and
defamation claims, the court explained that Morales could not
be read as indicating which types of common-law claims are in-
deed preempted, forcing courts to examine each case with its
underlying facts. 121 Upon reviewing the statements, the court
concluded that they only related to the travel agency's services
and not to any rate, route, or service provided by the air car-
rier.124  Additionally, the claims did not have what Morales
termed as "the forbidden significant [economic] effect on air-
line rates, routes, or services .... 125 Thus, the slander and
defamation claims were not preempted by the ADA.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. The court did indicate, however, that the existence of federal regula-
tions could lead to an implied preemption of state law claims. Id. at 1432 n.9.
The air carrier stated that because regulations permit breach of contract claims
to be maintained by "bumped" passengers with confirmed reservations (see De-
partment of Transportation (Aviation Proceedings) Economic Regulations, 14
C.F.R. § 250.9 (1996)), it followed that breach of contract claims by travel agen-
cies whose clients were bumped were preempted. Travel All Over the World, 73
F.3d at 1432. The court stated, however, that the lack of conflict between the
regulations in question and the state laws allowing travel agencies to sue pre-
cluded a finding of implied preemption. Id.
123 Id at 1433. The allegedly false statements made by Saudi to the group in-
cluded: (1) the travel agency had a bad reputation; (2) the travel agency had
failed to make reservations for the group; (3) the travel agency often lied to its
customers; and (4) the travel agency would not be sending a representative to
assist the group. Id.
124 Id. The court also expressly adopted the Fifth Circuit's definition of "serv-
ices" announced in Hodges- "a bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor
from one party to another." Id. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
125 Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1433.
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The court lastly examined the remaining intentional tort
claims, which were in part based upon the allegedly slanderous
and defamatory statements that the court had earlier ruled were
not preempted. The court also conceded that the intentional
tort claims were based in part on the air carrier's cancellation of
the group's reservations which forced the group to purchase
tickets directly from the air carrier. 126 The court declined to
rule on the question of preemption as applied to the intentional
tort claims pending further examination by the district court;
however, the court did offer a new methodology to assist the
district court in its determination. This determination centered
upon the contentious question of what constitutes a "service."
This new methodology departs from that offered by the Fifth
Circuit in Hodges and Smith, but did not explicitly accept the
methodology developed by the Ninth Circuit in Harris. None-
theless, the Seventh Circuit's approach can be seen as an im-
plicit approval of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Harris.
The court stated that the intentional tort claims, to the extent
that they were not based on the allegedly slanderous and defam-
atory statements, "expressly refer[red] to airline 'services,'
which include ticketing as well as the transportation itself'
under the Fifth Circuit's Hodges definition. 127 Thus, the claims
could be preempted. The travel agency, however, argued that
the claims should not be preempted due to the fact that the air
carrier had acted not in regard to its day-to-day business but
rather out of spite and with an intent to hurt the travel agency's
operations.1 2 The court did not accept this argument.
The court then announced its interpretation of Morales:
[T]he proper examination under Morales is not why the airline
refused to provide its services, but whether the claims at issue
either expressly refer to the airline's services (which they clearly
do) or would have a significant economic effect on the airline's
services .... The crucial inquiry is the underlying nature of the actions
taken, rather than the manner in which they are accomplished.'29
The court summarized its position by stating "[w] e therefore de-
cline to travel down the path paved [by the Fifth Circuit in
Hodges and Smith] which found that boarding decisions moti-
126 Id. at 1434.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. (emphasis added).
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vated by an airline's 'economic' concerns, as opposed to an air-
line's 'safety' concerns, were preempted.' 130
Thus, the Seventh Circuit expressly chose not to follow the
Fifth Circuit's dichotomy of "economic" services and "safety"
services, in which only claims based on the former are pre-
empted. Such an approach approximates the Ninth Circuit's
Harris reasoning in that in Travel All Over the World the "allega-
tions pertain[ed] directly to a 'service' the airlines render[ed]
... " and were thus preempted.1
3
'
The court concluded by directing the district court to ex-
amine the intentional tort claims in light of the aforementioned
approach. Only after the district court obtained more informa-
tion concerning the basis of the intentional tort claims could it
rule on the preemption issue. 132 Moreover, the court pointed
out that Wolens would not serve to save the intentional tort
claims from preemption because the tort claims "constitute [d]
the 'enactment or'enforcement' of a law" and were thus distin-
guishable from contract claims, despite the fact that intentional
tort claims were at least partially based on the same conduct of
the nonpreempted contract claims. 33
VIII. QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE APPELLATE
RULINGS
To date, three courts of appeals have dealt with the ADA pre-
emption provision since the Supreme Court handed down
Morales and Wolens. As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the
appellate courts have come to divergent conclusions concerning
the application of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
ADA. This fact is not surprising since Morales and Wolens do not
purport to be definitive opinions. The cases have led to much
litigation and will continue to do so.
An analysis will now be presented of three problematic issues
arising after Morales and Wolens. First, do "services" include "op-
eration and maintenance" activities? Second, do "services" in-
clude "safety" measures? Third, is Wolens subject to
manipulation through artful pleading?
130 Id. at 1434 n.12.
13, Harris, 55 F.3d at 1476.
132 Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1435.
133 Id.
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A. Do "SERVICES" INCLUDE "OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE"
ACTIVITIES?
As shown above,' the Fifth Circuit in Hodges announced a
new dichotomy concerning the interpretation of the term "serv-
ices." Under Hodges, state law tort claims arising from the "oper-
ation and maintenance of aircraft" are not preempted by the
ADA, while those claims that arise from "economic services"
are."' 5 Will this test prove to be one that leads to consistent
results?
Clearly this test can be easily applied to cases involving plane
crashes. Burke v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.136 provides proof for this
assertion. The plaintiffs alleged the following: (1) the air car-
rier had negligently trained its air crews; (2) the air carrier had
committed gross negligence in its conduct surrounding the col-
lision; and (3) the pilot of one of the aircraft was negligent.137
These claims all obviously stem from the "operation" of aircraft
and would not be preempted under the analysis put forth by the
Fifth Circuit in Hodges.
On the other hand, it may not always prove to be a simple task
to delineate what constitutes the "operation" of an aircraft and
what constitutes the "service" provided by an air carrier. The
provision of services may be inextricably tied to the operation of
aircraft. Christoph v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.I38 highlights the often
blurry line between "operations" and "services." In Christoph,
the air carrier permitted the plaintiff to bring her seeing-eye
dog on board a flight and allowed the dog to sit on the floor in
front of its owner while the plane was airborne. 39 The dog, un-
known to the plaintiff, had contracted a skin disease, which it
allegedly transferred to the plaintiff during flight by rubbing
against her leg. 40
Applying the Hodges formulation, the court ruled that the case
fell "within the bailiwick of operations and maintenance, not
134 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
135 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338-39.
136 819 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Mich. 1993). This case stemmed from the on-the-
ground collision of two aircraft owned by Northwest Airlines at the Detroit Air-
port on December 3, 1990. It is interesting to note that the court impliedly re-
jected claims stemming from allegedly deceptive advertising of "safe and reliable"
flights based on the Texas DTPA. Id. at 1368.
137 Id. at 1360.
138 No. 94-1148, 1995 WL 422147 (E.D. La. July 17, 1995).
139 Id. at *1-3.
140 Id. at *3.
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services. '  As the court saw it, service animals were "very simi-
lar" to carry-on baggage that an airline has a duty to safely stow;
therefore, the claim mirrored the claim put forth by the plaintiff
in Hodges concerning the handling of a passenger's baggage
and, thus, was not preempted. 1
42
Why, however, is the ability to take a seeing-eye dog on board
aircraft and its subsequent care by the air carrier not included in
the "bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor" indicative
of a "service" as indicated by the Hodges court? 4 ' It is entirely
plausible to read the Hodges definition of "service" in such a
manner so as to result in the preemption of such a claim as
brought forth in Christoph.
The court stated that it might have come to a different con-
clusion if the claim had "concerned the amount of seating space
provided to passengers.' 44 Question whether the claim did in-
deed stem from the amount of seating space provided passen-
gers. Christoph points out that courts can manipulate the Hodges
approach to narrowly interpret the term "services" and shelter
claims from preemption.
Similarly, the Hodges approach can be used to broadly inter-
pret the term "services." Marlow v. AMR Services Corp. 45 provides
an example of judicial manipulation of Hodges to protect an en-
tity owned by an air carrier. In Marlow, a company that main-
tainedjetbridges for an airline terminated an employee after he
reported safety violations to his supervisors. 46 The employee
brought a wrongful termination suit against the employer under
the Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act.14
7
The court found that the claim was preempted by the ADA.' 48
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the statement in
the first Hodges opinion that cases involving "boarding proce-
dures" should be preempted. 49 The court reasoned, therefore,
that the claim was preempted because the service and mainte-
141 Id. at *2.
142 Id.
143 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336.
144 Christoph, No. 94-1148, 1995 WL 422147, at *2.
145 870 F. Supp. 295 (D. Haw. 1994).
146 Id. at 297.
147 Id. The statutes in question can be found at HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-61 to
378-69 (1994).
148 Marlow, 870 F. Supp. at 299.
149 Id. at 298 (citing Hodges, 44 F.3d at 354). Note that the second Hodges opin-
ion adopted the same definition of "services" as used in the first opinion. See
supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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nance of jetbridges are an integral part of boarding proce-
dures.15 ° This result is certainly open to question.15 1 It can be
argued that maintenance of ajetbridge is not part of the "antici-
pated provision of labor" that passengers expect when purchas-
ing a ticket. The application of Hodges, therefore, could have
led to the opposite result in Marlow.
The Supreme Court of Texas has also spoken out concerning
the shortcomings of the services/operations and maintenance
dichotomy. In Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 5 2 Justice Na-
than Hecht, in an opinion joined by seven of the eight remain-
ing justices, pointed out three problems with the Fifth Circuit's
Hodges dichotomy. 1 5 3
First, he stated that Morales and Wolens do not support such a
dichotomy and that the "services-operations distinction is an un-
necessary overlay . . . . ," ' Next, Justice Hecht stated that the
dichotomy is "difficult to draw," as evidenced in Hodges itself by
the fact that two justices of the Fifth Circuit viewed the claims
under review as relating to services and not operations. 155 Jus-
tice Hecht also demonstrated that the Hodges dichotomy will
lead to "anomalous results.' 1 56 As an example, he argued that
under Hodges, "[a]n airplane passenger who fell in an aisle
would be prohibited from suing if the accident occurred when
the passenger slipped on food dropped by a flight attendant,
but not if the accident was caused by a sudden banking of the
plane." 157 One can easily conclude, therefore, that the Hodges
The definition of "services" used by the Fifth Circuit is problematic due to the
fact that it can be interpreted in many ways. For example, in Lathigra v. British
Airways P.L.C., 41 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994), the court did not preempt a claim
against an airline stemming from "negligent reconfirmation" because the con-
duct complained of did not "serve [ ] the goals of airline deregulation ...... Id.
at 540. Question, however, whether reconfirmation of a booking is again in-
cluded in the "bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor" indicative of a
"service" as indicated by the Hodges court. Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336.
150 Marlow, 870 F. Supp. at 299.
15" See, e.g., Ruggiero v. AMR Corp., No. C-94-20160JW, 1995 WL 549010 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 12, 1995) (expressing doubt as to the soundness of the Marlow
decision).
152 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
153 Id. at 283-84.
154 Id. at 283.
155 Id. (citing Hodges, 44 F.3d at 343-44 (Higginbotham, J. joined by Garza, J.,
dissenting)).
156 Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 284.
157 Id. Indeed, claims against air carriers that stem from the negligent flying of
aircraft are generally not preempted by the ADA. See, e.g., Trinidad v. American
Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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dichotomy of services/operations and maintenance is untenable
and will lead to inconsistent results.
B. Do "SERVICES" INCLUDE "SAFET"' MEASURES?
A second important aspect of the Fifth Circuit's approach is
the argument (initially put forth in the first Hodges opinion) that
"'services' is not coextensive with airline 'safety.' 158 As shown
above, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have declined to fol-
low this dichotomy. Can the Fifth Circuit's approach be applied
with consistent results?
Belgard v. United Airlines, Inc.'59 can be used to test the Fifth
Circuit's methodology. Belgard dealt with an airline's decision
not to promote a group of pilots who had undergone radial ker-
atotomy procedures to correct their vision. 160 The plaintiffs al-
leged that their failure to receive promotions constituted a
violation of a Colorado statute prohibiting discrimination based
on physical handicap. 61 The airline naturally argued that the
plaintiffs' claims were preempted.1 62 Citing Morales, a Colorado
appellate court held that the claims were indeed preempted be-
cause the Colorado statute in question could "be said to have a
connection with or reference to the airline's 'services. '163
The court first pointed to language in the ADA stating that
two of its most important purposes are the "maintenance of
safety as the highest priority in air commerce" and the "place-
ment of maximum reliance on competitive market forces."1' 64
The court also reasoned that the ability to work safely is part of
the service offered by airlines; thus, the restriction of promo-
tions based on physical characteristics that could potentially im-
pact upon safety concerns was sufficiently related to services to
be covered by the preemption provision.1 65
158 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 354. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
159 857 P.2d 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1117 (1994).
160 Id. at 468.
161 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402(1)(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
162 Belgard, 857 P.2d at 470.
163 Id.
164 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1302(a)(1), (4) (West 1992)) (current version
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(1), (12) (1994)).
165 Belgard, 857 P.2d at 471. The court cited two cases for support: French v.
Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) (state statute mandating drug
testing preempted as applied to airline employees); Trans World Airways, Inc. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978) (preder-
egulation version of Federal Aviation Act preempted arbitration award under
Railway Labor Act).
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Under the Fifth Circuit's approach, however, the plaintiffs'
claims under the Colorado statute may not have been pre-
empted. Because "'services' [are] not coextensive with airline
'safety,""" courts in the Fifth Circuit might feel compelled to
rule differently than the Belgard court. There is no doubt that
the refusal to promote pilots who have undergone radial ker-
atotomy procedures stems entirely from safety concerns. Thus,
under Hodges, such a claim could be shielded from preemption.
The logic of the Belgard court, on the other hand, is quite
sound. Would anyone refute the fact that "few factors are more
important in determining the nature of the services that an air-
line is to provide than the quality of its employees"?1 61
Belgard is not the only case that views pilot staffing as part of
the "services" provided by airlines. In Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc.,168 several hundred former Pan Am pilots hired by
Delta sued Delta claiming that it had discriminated against them
based on their age in violation of New York law due to the fact
that the pilots were required to serve ten years before becoming
eligible for full post-retirement medical benefits.'69 The court
found that pilot staffing related to the services provided by Delta
as "an integral element of the transportation itself."17 Thus, the
pilots' claims were preempted.
Moreover, Texas Supreme Court Justice Hecht in his Kiefer
opinion also pointed out that the services/safety dichotomy
does not serve to ease the analysis required of courts in preemp-
tion cases.'71 As Justice Hecht stated, "It is hard to imagine a
service provided by airlines that does not have both an eco-
nomic and a safety component."'72 The clear implication of this
statement and the above analysis is that the services/safety di-
166 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 354.
167 Belgard, 857 P.2d at 471. Another interesting example in the employment
area is provided by Ruggiero v. AMR Corp., No. C-94-20160 JW, 1995 WL 549010
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1995). The plaintiff brought a wrongful termination suit
against an airline stemming from his termination after failing to gain certifica-
tion on a certain aircraft. The plaintiff also alleged that he was terminated due to
the fact that he had encouraged fellow employees to make safety and sexual har-
assment complaints against the airline. The court concluded that the claim was
not preempted and distinguished Belgard on the grounds that it was not dealing
with a case regarding physical requirements to operate aircraft. Id. at *8-9.
1- 927 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
169 Id. at 110. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997).
170 Abdu-Brisson, 927 F. Supp. at 112.




chotomy can lead to inconsistent results and is simply
untenable.
Another group of cases that is difficult to deal with under the
services/safety dichotomy are those involving a failure to pro-
vide key personnel. Moore v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.173 is an excel-
lent test case. In Moore, the plaintiff sued an air carrier
stemming from personal injuries incurred when the plaintiffs
wheelchair overturned backwards in a jetbridge while dis-
embarking from an aircraft. 174 The plaintiff claimed that the air
carrier was grossly negligent in failing to provide him with per-
sonnel and services which would have guaranteed his safety.
The air carrier argued that the claim should have been pre-
empted and relied upon the language in Hodges that the ADA
preempts cases involving "boarding procedures. ' 175 The court,
however, did not accept this argument and stated that Smith
obliged it to distinguish between claims that involve economic
decisions concerning the provision of services and those that do
not. 176 Such reasoning again reflects the dichotomy of "serv-
ices" versus "safety" now in effect in the Fifth Circuit.
In coming to its conclusion, the court quoted from Smith:
"[I]t is reasonable to interpret the 'service' of boarding to be
limited to economic decisions concerning boarding . . . . 177
On the other hand, however, is it not equally as reasonable to
interpret the "service" of boarding to include the actual physical
process of boarding itself? Again, is assistance with boarding,
especially for one confined to a wheelchair, not included in the
"bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor" indicative of a
"service" as indicated by the Hodges court?178
Such an analysis becomes less complicated when a disabled
passenger pays an airline to provide such "meet and assist" serv-
ices and the airline fails to do so, as was the situation in one of
the cases dealt with by the Texas Supreme Court in the afore-
mentioned Kiefer case. 179 Clearly such claims can be couched in
173 897 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
174 Id. at 314.
175 Id. at 315. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336.
176 Moore, 897 F. Supp. at 315. See Smith, 44 F.3d at 346-47.
177 Id.
178 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
179 Kiefer dealt with two consolidated claims against two airlines. The first claim
stemmed from injuries incurred when a passenger was struck in the head by a
falling briefcase and the second claim stemmed from the failure to provide "meet
and assist" services under a fee agreement between a passenger and an airline.
Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 275.
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terms of breach of contract and, therefore, under Wolens, would
not be preempted. Damages would, of course, be limited to
those for breach of contract and not for negligence. Absent a
fee agreement, as demonstrated above, the analysis is much less
clear. The fact that a "meet and assist" claim arguably could be
preempted but for the existence of a contract to provide such a
service highlights why it is important to review the propriety of
cases such as Moore.
The preceding analysis highlights the interpretive problems
inherent to the Fifth Circuit's approach. Such problems no
doubt played a role in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' refusal to
follow Hodges and Smith in their entirety. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that the Ninth Circuit's Harris reasoning has come under
scrutiny as well.
A California appeals court criticized Harris in Romano v. Ameri-
can Trans Air,18° a case involving passenger battery. The court
pointed out that Harris included a forceful dissent and that the
Ninth Circuit panel appeared to neglect the aim of the ADA,
namely the economic deregulation of the airline industry.'
According to the Romano court, the Hodges dichotomies are cor-
rect in that they serve to protect the "legitimate interest[s]" of
airlines (the rights to advertise, set routes, and determine in-
flight menus, among others), l.2 At least two other cases exist
which similarly chide the Ninth Circuit for supposedly ignoring
the intent of the ADA through its broad reading of the term
"services."' 83 Such discourse indicates the need for further gui-
dance from both Congress and the Supreme Court.
C. Is WOLENS SUBJECT TO MANIPULATION THROUGH ARTFUL
PLEADING?
Another problematic issue raised by recent interpretations of
the ADA preemption clause is that the Supreme Court's holding
in Wolens may create an incentive for litigants to engage in artful
pleading. For example, in Stone v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,'
the plaintiffs filed suit against an air carrier by asserting claims
of assault and battery, negligence, and breach of implied war-
180 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
181 Id. at 432.
182 Id. at 433.
183 See Ducombs v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 897, 901 (N.D. Cal.
1996); Costa v. American Airlines, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 237, 238 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
184 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
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ranty.115 The court dismissed the assault and battery and negli-
gence claims because they were very similar to the claims found
to be preempted by the Ninth Circuit in Harris in that the claims
"directly pertain[ed] to Continental's treatment of its
passengers."'8 6
The court then examined the claim of breach of implied war-
ranty that arose from the air carrier's alleged failure to "provide
[the] Plaintiffs a safe and secure premise for the airline
flight.1 8 7 The court stated that the Wolens exception from pre-
emption only applied to terms in contracts for which the parties
actually bargained.' In the eyes of the court, the ADA none-
theless preempted "any state law or public policy claims dis-
guised as contract claims." '
Upon examining the plaintiffs' claims, the court ruled that
the claims did not fit within the Wolens exception because the
claim of "breach of implied warranty [was] based on the same
facts and allegations underlying [the] tort actions."' 9 ° What was
important to the court was the substance of the claim and not
the form in which it was presented. The court concluded that
ruling otherwise would result in the purposes of the ADA being
subverted.191
Not all courts, however, may be as willing as the Stone court to
apply Wolens in a similar manner. Aguasviva v. Iberia Lineas Aer-
eas de Espaia'192 provides an example of this fact. In Aguasviva,
the plaintiff brought suit against an air carrier stemming from
her arrest in Istanbul, Turkey, during a layover on a flight from
San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Israel due to the fact that she did not
have a Turkish visa.193 The plaintiff alleged what the court
termed as two "distinct" claims against the air carrier: (1) a
185 Id. at 824. The claims stemmed from an incident that allegedly took place
on a flight from Los Angeles to Honolulu and continuing to Australia during
which a passenger punched Plaintiff Stone. Stone also brought claims under the
Warsaw Convention and for punitive damages. Id.
186 Id. at 826.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. The court further quoted from Wolens. "This distinction between what
the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines courts, in breach
of contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement
based on state laws or policies external to the agreement." Id. (quoting Wolens,
115 S. Ct. at 826).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 902 F. Supp. 314 (D.P.R. 1995).
1- Id. at 316.
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breach of contract that resulted from the air carrier's failure to
notify her about the visa requirement; and (2) a statutory claim
under Puerto Rico law for defamation, false arrest and imprison-
ment, assault, and negligence. 94 The court held that neither
claim was preempted and relied on the Fifth Circuit's approach
to reach this conclusion on the tort claims.
95
Turning to the breach of contract claims, the court stated that
Wolens left "no doubt" that those claims were not preempted
due to the fact that the plaintiff was seeking to enforce a private
agreement between herself and the air carrier. " 6 If, however,
the court had chosen to use the Ninth Circuit's approach and
preempted the tort claims, would not the contract claims have
been "based on the same facts and allegations underlying [the]
tort actions"?' 97 As stated above, such reasoning led the Stone
court to preempt the breach of contract claims. Thus, the
Wolens decision appears to be open to manipulation if courts are
not wary of tort claims disguised as breach of contract claims. 198
Manipulation of Wolens is also possible by litigants who at-
tempt to recast legitimate contract claims in terms of negli-
gence. An example of this possibility is provided by Trujillo v.
American Airlines, Inc.,' 99 a case dealing with an air carrier's fail-
ure to deliver a package.
The plaintiff contracted with the air carrier to ship jewelry val-
ued at $23,490 from Los Angeles to Dallas. "°° An employee of
the air carrier mistakenly informed the plaintiff that insurance
was unavailable for the package, a fact which was untrue.2 "1 At
the same time, however, the plaintiff failed to inform the air
carrier of the value of the items he wished to ship.2 ° 2 The court
194 Id. at 317. The relevant provision of the Puerto Rico Civil Code states: "A
person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." P.R. LAws ANN., tit.
31, § 5141 (1991).
195 Aguasviva, 902 F. Supp. at 318-19.
1i6 Id. at 318.
197 Stone, 905 F. Supp. at 826.
198 See Chukwu v. British Airways, 889 F. Supp. 12 (D. Mass. 1995) and
Chukwu v. Varig Airlines, 880 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1995) for two cases in which
preemption arguments failed involving what may be termed "pure" breach of
contract claims arising from air carriers' refusal to transport a ticket holder.
Such claims exemplify what the Wolens exception seeks to protect from
preemption.
199 938 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Tex. 1995).





granted summary judgment in favor of the air carrier on a
breach of contract claim, but awarded plaintiff $126.50 as pro-
vided for in the waybill.20 ' Thereafter, the plaintiff asserted
claims against the air carrier for negligence, gross negligence,
and under the Texas DTPA.2 °4 In dismissing those claims, the
court stated that the "[p] laintiffs breach of contract claim was
the means by which he could enforce the agreement for services
.... [and that he could not] cast his claims as ones for negli-
gence or deceptive trade practices to extend his recovery be-
yond the terms of the contract.
20 5
This analysis demonstrates that courts must pay particular at-
tention to the substance, and not merely the form, of claims
against airlines. Failure to do so can result in an abuse of the
Wolens exception.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, it has been shown that the appellate rulings
interpreting Morales and Wolens will not lead to consistent adju-
dication of claims involving the application of the ADA preemp-
tion clause. This fact is not surprising because each of the three
circuits that have handed down cases interpreting Morales and
Wolens have interpreted those two cases in different ways. Fur-
ther guidance is therefore needed to resolve the conflicting in-
terpretations of the ADA preemption clause. This guidance
should preferably come from Congress.
Congress should clarify whether it agrees with the position ad-
vocated by the Fifth Circuit in Hodges and Smith or the vastly
different positions supported by the Ninth Circuit in Harris and
the Seventh Circuit in Travel All Over the World. While the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation appears to have a logical basis, it has
been demonstrated that its application will very likely lead to
irreconcilable results. On the other hand, it can be argued the
position taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits ignores the
intent of the ADA.
Additionally, the Supreme Court should clarify the exception
it crafted in Wolens. As the holding now stands, it is subject to
manipulation by litigants attempting to construe tort claims as
contract claims or contract claims as tort claims through the use
of artful pleadings.
203 Id. at 393 n.3.
204 Id. at 393.
205 Id. at 394.
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The airline industry is a vital part of the U.S. economy. In
order for air carriers to properly assess the risk and rewards in-
herent in their operations, Congress and the Supreme Court
must announce a more definitive explanation of the preemp-
tion of state law claims against airlines provided for in the ADA.
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